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Abstract: In the General Psychopathology Jaspers famously draws a distinction between the understandable and 
explainable. Meaningful connections between psychic events, he argues, can only be understood empathetically and 
cannot be explained causally. The idea behind this distinction, according to some interpreters at least, seems to be that 
psychic events do not fall under any general causal rules whereas ordinary events do fall under such rules. Also Jaspers 
distinguishes empathetic understanding of the connection between two psychic events from a mere interpretation of 
it, which may turn out to be false. Hence, understanding seems to be able to give us the truth about the connection and 
is factive as well as self-evident in nature. Contemporary epistemologists, such as Linda Zagzebsky, Duncan Pritchard, 
and Jonathan Kvanvig, for example, distinguish three varieties: propositional, objectual or holistic, and atomistic 
understanding. They do not agree on factivity and transparency of understanding. What then is the difference between 
their views and that of Jaspers? This essay compares recent epistemological views of understanding with those of Jaspers 
and critiques his claims about empathetic understanding as being both factive and self-evident or transparent; to show 
that empathetic understanding of connections between psychic events needs a public criterion for its individuation.
Keywords: Jaspers, Karl; epistemology; empathetic understanding; objectual understanding; holistic understanding; 
understanding as factive; understanding as transparent.
experience that a number of phenomena are regularly 
linked together, and on this basis we explain causally. 
[GP 301]
From the epistemic perspective we sink into another 
person's psychic situation and through this empathetic 
experience grasp what Jaspers calls "meaningful 
connections" between psychic events (GP 304). This 
type of experience is obviously different from our 
experience of regular linkage between phenomena that 
helps us see the causal connections. Ontologically the 
object of our empathetic experience of another's psychic 
situation are the elements of meaningful connections 
as opposed to elements of causal connections that are 
grasped through experience of regular linkages.
Karl Jaspers' Distinction
Basic Specifications
Jaspers' famous distinction between "explainable" and 
"understandable" in the General Psychopathology is both 
epistemic and ontological.1  He draws the distinction in 
the following way:
1. We sink ourselves into the psychic situation and 
understand genetically by empathy how one psychic 
event emerges from another. 2. We find by repeated 
1 Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, trans. J. Hoenig 
and Marian W. Hamilton, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997. [Henceforth cited as GP]
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by the same term, "subjective." Subjective symptoms 
cannot be perceived by the sense organs, but have to 
be grasped by transferring oneself, so to say, into the 
other individual's psyche; that is, by empathy. They 
can only become an inner reality for the observer by 
his participating in the other person's experiences, not 
by any intellectual effort.2
This empathy or genetic understanding is what 
"grasps as self-evident how one psychic event emerges 
from another; how a man attacked should be angry, a 
betrayed lover jealous" (PAP 1322).
Elaboration
Given these specifications about empathetic 
understanding, we need to ask ourselves as to what 
sense one can make of his distinction between the 
understandable and explainable? At the first blush the 
idea seems to be that the distinction is between causal 
understanding of events that we call their explanation 
and some kind of an immediate grasp of relationships 
between mental events that is acquired through 
immersion into the other's psyche. But the question is, 
how does one understand the meaningful connection 
between two psychic events empathetically? Event 
A leads to event B in the psyche of a mental patient. I 
imagine myself to be in the same situation as the patient 
and empathize to see the connection between A and B. 
In Jaspers' own characterization it comes to me as self-
evident that A has led to B. Jaspers considers this to be 
a personal insight that is not based on any observed 
regularity between occurrence of A leading to B. It is a 
fresh intuition every time. Also it can be either genuine 
understanding or a mere interpretation depending 
on whether or not it successfully makes the patient's 
experience visible to me (cf. GP 312-3).
There are two issues that need to be addressed 
here. First, we need to figure out the way in which 
event B emerges out of event A. Second, we need 
to figure out as to what is the public criterion for the 
veracity of my personal intuition of the meaningful 
connection between A and B. I will return to the second 
issue below but as far as the first is concerned, if the 
connection between the two events is meaningful rather 
than causal, then how do we construe the nature of this 
2 Karl Jaspers, "The Phenomenological Approach in 
Psychopathology," The British Journal of Psychiatry 
114/516 (1968), 1313-1323, here p. 1313 [henceforth 
cited as PAP]; originally published in Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie 9/1 (1912) 391-408.
The idea here seems to be that explanation is 
focused on uncovering causal connections that are 
mostly taken as mechanistic in the post-Newtonian 
era. This same mechanistic model does not apply, in 
Jaspers' opinion, to the mental life. This is obviously 
because there are no mechanistic regularities that can 
be experienced or discovered as governing mental life.
Jaspers distinguishes empathetic understanding 
not only from causal explanation but also from rational 
understanding. In his own words:
Rational understanding always leads to a statement 
that the psychic content was simply a rational 
connection, understandable without the help of any 
psychology. Empathic understanding, on the other 
hand, always leads directly into the psychic connection 
itself. [GP 304]
The point of this distinction seems to be that psychic 
connections are not all of them only rational in 
their nature. Some of these connections elude 
rational understanding and can be understood only 
empathetically by sinking into the psyche of the other. 
The mental life or consciousness, therefore, is not all 
of it understandable through discovering rational 
connections between psychic events. In particular 
mental patients exhibit or experience psychic events 
that can be understood not in ordinary rational terms 
but only imaginatively sinking into the patient's psyche. 
Does that mean that our empathetic understanding 
is extra-rational? I think not. Presumably it is creative 
or inventive reason—as Karl Popper would call it—
that comes into play to see these special meaningful 
connections between psychic events.
Jaspers also takes empathetic understanding to 
be factive when successful and distinguishes it from 
what he calls interpretation of a psychic connection. 
Successful or true empathetic understanding yields an 
insight that is self-evident. It helps us see the other's 
experience as it really is. A mere interpretation is when 
such empathetic understanding fails to expose such 
experience to us correctly.
In a 1912 article Jaspers draws a distinction between 
what he calls objective and subjective symptoms of 
mental disorder and argues as follows:
Objective symptoms can all be directly and 
convincingly demonstrated to anyone capable of 
sense-perception and logical thought; but subjective 
symptoms, if they are to be understood, must be 
referred to some process which, in contrast to sense-
perception and logical thought, is usually described 
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relationship? Jaspers' word "emerge" seems to suggest 
some kind of a causal linkage between the two psychic 
events, but if meaningful connection is construed as 
ultimately causal in nature, then the need for drawing a 
distinction between the understandable and explainable 
evaporates. Meaningful relationship between the 
two psychic events becomes causal relationship and, 
hence, remains no longer different from the explainable 
relations. Therefore, we need to resist the temptation to 
interpret Jaspers' word "emerge" in causal terms.
Causality is understood in terms of regularity of 
linkage between two events (David Hume's constant 
conjunction, for example) and that is how Jaspers' text 
seems to define it when he talks about "phenomena 
regularly linked together." But the case of psychic events 
is much more complex. Laws or generalizations of the 
sort that govern normal causally related, say physical 
events, do not govern the relationships between 
psychic events. Since such laws are missing in case of 
psychic events, the relationship between them needs to 
be understood in terms of one particular event leading 
to another. No generality or regularity is expected. We 
need a fresh personal intuition every time to grasp 
such relationship. These relationships are meaningful 
but cannot be interpreted in causal terms because, as 
some philosophers of science have argued, there are no 
strict laws or regularities in special sciences of which 
psychology is one.3 
What is the, sense, then in which one psychic event 
emerges from another? If there are no strict laws or 
regularities governing the connections between psychic 
events, then, perhaps, they get connected with each other 
rather randomly through new and creative linkages 
between their meanings for the patient. Jaspers says:
How do we proceed when we isolate, characterize and 
give conceptual form to these psychic phenomena? 
We cannot portray them, or bring them before 
our eyes in any way that can be perceived by the 
senses. We can only guide ourselves and others by a 
multiple approach. We have to be led, starting from 
the outside, to a real appreciation of a particular 
psychic phenomenon, by looking at its genesis, the 
condition for its appearance, its configurations, its 
context and possible concrete contents; also by making 
use of intuitive comparison and symbolization, by 
directing our observations in whatever ways may 
suggest themselves (as artists do penetratingly) and 
3 See Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: A 
Contemporary Introduction, New York and London: 
Routledge 2012, p. 102.
by demonstrating already known phenomena which 
appear to play some part in the formation of the 
phenomenon studied. [PAP 1316]
This passage points, among other things, to 
the creative/artistic nature of how one understands 
meaningful connections between psychic phenomena. 
There are no set rules for working out such intuitive 
and creative comparisons. It appears, therefore, that 
empathetic understanding gives us linkages between 
psychic events that are creative like insights of artists. 
It is, perhaps, for this reason that Jaspers notes about 
empathetic understanding that "we can never give it 
recognition as 'science'" (PAP 1315).
Understanding in Contemporary Epistemology
A number of leading contemporary epistemologists 
have started paying attention to the epistemic state 
of understanding instead of just continuing the focus 
on knowledge. Jonathan Kvanvig, Linda Zagzebsky, 
Duncan Pritchard, Stephen R. Grimm and many others 
have recently explored understanding as an epistemic 
state. Generally there are three types of understanding 
that some of these epistemologists talk about, i.e., 
propositional understanding, objectual understanding, 
and atomistic understanding.4 Propositional 
understanding is where object of understanding is a 
proposition or referent of a that-clause. For example, 
"Neil understands that X" or, "Neil understands that the 
school closes at 4:00 pm."
Objectual understanding is holistic in nature. 
When we say "John understands bio-ethics," we are 
talking about objectual understanding. Lastly, atomistic 
understanding is concerned with understanding the 
"why" of a situation, for example, "Ruth knows why the 
school was closed."
As far as propositional understanding is concerned, 
epistemologists have noted that it cannot be generally 
distinguished from propositional knowledge.5 Hence, 
4 For example, Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge 
and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. [Henceforth cited as VK]
5 See Duncan Pritchard, "Knowledge, Understanding 
and Epistemic Value," in Epistemology, ed. Anthony 
O'Hear, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press 2009, pp. 19-43, here pp. 30-1. [Henceforth 
quoted as UEV] See also Emma C. Gordon, “Is There 
Propositional Understanding?" Logos & Episteme  3/2 
(2012), 181-192, here pp. 187-8.
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knowledge and non-propositional understanding. This 
type of understanding bears resemblance to Jaspers' 
view of empathetic understanding.
Jonathan Kvanvig's View
Kvanvig is primarily interested in objectual/holisitc 
understanding, although he does distinguish three 
types: propositional, wh-understanding (his term for 
understanding—that answers why, when, where, or 
what questions), and objectual (VK 5). He says:
To understand is to grasp the variety of such 
connections. It involves seeing explanatory 
connections, being aware of the probabilistic 
interrelationships, and apprehending the logical 
implications of the information in question. There 
is, of course, an element of factivity to the notion 
of under- standing, just as there is with the notion 
of knowledge. But when we move past the alethic 
aspect of both notions, our attention turns to diverse 
paths. When the question is whether one knows, the 
issues that are foremost in our minds are issues about 
evidence, reliability, reasons for belief, and, perhaps 
most importantly, non-accidentality regarding the 
connection between our grounds for belief and the 
truth of the belief. When the question is whether one 
has understanding, the issues that are foremost in our 
minds are issues about the extent of our grasp of the 
structural relationships (e.g., logical, probabilistic, 
and explanatory relationships) between the central 
items of information regarding which the question of 
understanding arises. [VK 3]
These remarks show that Kvanvig is concerned 
with holistic or objectual understanding. What 
Pritchard refers to as atomistic understanding seems 
to be Kvanvig's wh-understanding. The difference 
between objectual and wh-understanding is that the 
later focuses on a single wh-question while the former 
is about understanding a whole through grasping 
structural connections between its parts.
Duncan Pritchard's View
Pritchard, while considering whether knowledge 
or understanding is distinctively valuable, criticizes 
both Zagzebsky and Kvanvig for their takes on 
understanding and believes atomistic understanding 
to be primary or paradigmatic. For example, about 
Zagzebsky's position he says:
So the transparency and non-factivity claims that 
Zagzebski offers are false. It is difficult to diagnose 
basically we have two types of understanding that are 
considered as paradigmatic by recent epistemologist, 
atomistic and objectual or holistic. Pritchard takes 
atomistic understanding to be the basic paradigm while 
Kvanvig and Zagzebsky take the holistic understanding 
to be so. Let us look at their views.
Linda Zagzebsky's View
Understanding might be a form of knowledge, 
says Zagzebsky, but she wants to point to a kind of 
understanding that is non-propositional in character, 
like understanding gained from a map or a graph, 
and so on. Such an understanding is not the same as 
understanding a set of propositions. She then adds 
two points that come out of Plato's epistemology and 
that distinguish understanding from propositional 
knowledge: (i) understanding is connected with 
mastery of an art, a skill, or technê and, (ii) understanding 
involves grasping of relations between parts or 
between parts and a whole. These relations could be 
spatial, temporal, or causal—what Stephan Grimm 
characterizes as "dependence."6
To these points from Plato she adds a third of 
her own that similarly distinguishes understanding 
from propositional knowledge. Zagzebsky argues 
that while we can, under the right conditions, have 
propositional knowledge by testimony, we cannot have 
understanding by testimony. Understanding cannot 
be conveyed to another person. It is not a matter of 
conveying the right belief to another person as we do in 
case of testimonial knowledge.7 
From these views it can be inferred that Zagzebsky 
is primarily talking about objectual or holistic 
understanding. When she says that understanding 
might be a form of knowledge, she appears to be 
talking about propositional understanding. So she 
distinguishes propositional understanding from non-
propositional understanding, and takes mastery of an 
art and grasping of dependency relations as marks of 
non-propositional understanding. This later type of 
understanding fits the characterizations of objectual 
or holistic understanding in literature. So we can 
take Zagzebsky to be clearly distinguishing between 
6 See Stephan Grimm, "The Goal of Explanation," 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41/4 (2010), 
337-344, here p. 341.
7 See Linda Zagzebsky, On Epistemology, Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth, Cengage Learning 2009, pp. 141-5.
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why Zagzebski made this mistake. Part of the reason 
may be that there is a failure to be clear about the type 
of understanding under consideration. After all, when 
it comes to the kind of holistic understanding that 
applies to a subject matter, this plausibly is compatible 
with at least some false beliefs about that subject 
matter, but this sort of understanding is precisely not 
the sort at issue. Moreover, it would seem that the 
analogue of Zagzebski's non-factivity claim as regards 
understanding when it comes to holistic understanding 
would be that such understanding can be possessed 
even though one has no relevant true beliefs, and that 
is surely implausible. [UEV 33]
The sort of understanding that Pritchard seems 
to be taking as primary is wh-understanding or what 
he calls atomistic understanding. He considers such 
understanding to be non-transparent, factive, and 
immune to epistemic luck of the environmental variety, 
though not Gettier-style epistemic luck. He contrasts his 
position with Zagzebsky and Kvanvig in this regard. 
Zagzebsky takes understanding to be transparent, non-
factive, and immune to epistemic luck.8 Kvanvig, on the 
other hand, takes understanding to be non-transparent 
and non-factive and immune to epistemic luck (VK 197). 
He also allows that understanding, unlike knowledge, 
admits of degrees, meaning that while knowledge (of 
a proposition, for example) is either an all or nothing 
affair, understanding (of an art, for example) can be of 
various degrees.
In Pritchard's view, factivity of understanding 
entails that, in genuinely understanding something, one 
attains true relevant beliefs about it. For understanding 
to be transparent means that there is no distinction 
between seemingly understanding something and 
really understanding it. Immunity to epistemic luck 
means that understanding is not produced by some 
accidental factors but results from the abilities of the 
epistemic agent. Pritchard brings out a distinction 
between two types of epistemic luck: Gettier-style luck 
and environmental luck. Gettier-style luck can intervene 
between the ability of an agent to know or understand 
and success of that agent in reaching true belief. Take the 
now common sheep-dog example from epistemology 
literature. An agent is looking at a field and sees a sheep 
in the distance. In reality, however, she is looking at a 
rock structure that looks like a sheep. She forms the 
8 Linda Zagzebsky, "Recovering Understanding," 
in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic 
Justification, Responsibility and Virtue, ed. Matthias 
Steup, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
belief that there is a sheep in the field. Unbeknownst to 
her there is a sheep in the field behind the rock structure. 
So her belief is correct though gettierized in the sense 
that it is true accidentally and not because of her ability. 
Hence, she fails to have knowledge of the matter. This is 
Gettier-style luck. Pritchard argues that understanding, 
like knowledge, is not immune to this type of luck.
Next, imagine an artist who has carved sheep out 
of several rocks in the field. They all look like real sheep 
from where the agent is standing. In the middle of these 
statues, there is a real sheep grazing in the field. The 
agent looks toward the field and sees a sheep there. By 
sheer luck her eyes fall on the real sheep and she attains 
the belief that there is a sheep in the field. Her belief is 
true and it is true also because of her ability to perceive. 
Pritchard argues that this type of environmental luck is 
not compatible with knowledge. The agent in question 
does not have the knowledge that there is a sheep in the 
field because she might as well have cast her glance on a 
sheep statue. It is sheer accident that she has succeeded 
in reaching true belief.
However, Pritchard argues that this type of 
environmental luck is compatible with atomistic 
understanding. He explains the point through the 
following example: Suppose I ask a fire officer why my 
house was burning. She tells me that it was because 
of faulty wiring. This makes me understand why my 
house was burnt. Now suppose further that, by chance, 
there were some people dressed as fire officers going 
to nearby fancy dress party. It was just by sheer luck 
that I hit upon the real officer in that environment. Do 
I still understand why my house got burnt? Pritchard 
says, yes. This type of environmental luck does not 
undermine my understanding as to why my house 
got burnt. If faulty wiring was the real cause, I still 
understand it. The point is that environmental luck 
undermines knowledge but it cannot undermine 
understanding. This goes to show that there is a 
distiction between the two.
Comparison with Karl Jaspers
Jaspers is concerned with empathetic understanding. 
He does consider it to be factive, as noted above, and 
also contends that it comes to us as self-evident. I think 
that this self-evidence of empathetic understanding of 
meaningful connections between psychic events is the 
same thing as transparency of understanding talked 
about by epistemologists. The reason is that appearance 
of self-evidence cannot be distinguished from real self-
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evidence. Both are one and the same. A self-evident 
truth is justified by one's very understanding of it and is 
non-inferential or immediate. With this kind of truths, 
understanding is the same thing as justifiably believing. 
There is no distinction between appearance of truth and 
real truth.
This makes Jaspers position on empathetic 
understanding to be quite unique. None of the three 
epistemologists discussed above take either objectual 
or atomistic understanding to be both factive and 
transparent. For Zagzebsky objectual or holistic 
understanding is transparent but not factive. For 
Kvanvig holistic understanding is neither factive nor 
transparent. Pritchard takes atomistic understanding 
to be factive but not transparent. So Jaspers is unique 
in holding empathetic understanding to be both factive 
and transparent.
Now, contemporary epistemologists look at 
understanding as grasp of structural relations between 
parts as we noted above in Zagzebsky. Kvanvig has 
similar views and says:
When the question is whether one has understanding, 
the issues that are foremost in our minds are issues 
about the extent of our grasp of the structural 
relationships (e.g., logical, probabilistic, and 
explanatory relationships) between the central items 
of information regarding which the question of 
understanding arises. [VK 3]
Pritchard's position on atomistic understanding is not 
different. He remarks:
I want to take the paradigm usage of "understands" 
to be in a statement like "I understand why such-
and-such is the case." Notice that this usage is very 
different from a more holistic usage which applies to 
subject matters, as in "I understand quantum physics," 
or even "I understand my wife." I think the holistic 
usage of "understands" is related to the non-holistic, or 
atomistic, usage that is our focus, but the former raises 
problems of its own that we've not the space to cover 
here. [UEV 31]
Given this take on understanding the question 
is whether or not Jaspers would agree with this 
view in relation to empathetic understanding. I 
think his position is similar on this issue. Empathetic 
understanding after all aims at sinking into the other's 
psyche to see meaningful connections between two 
psychic events. This is obviously an effort to answer 
the question why an event B is the case? Empathetic 
understanding, therefore, is atomistic in character.
Can such understanding be both factive and 
transparent? Pritchard argues against such a position:
[I]f understanding is factive then it clearly cannot be 
transparent as the factivity of understanding would 
require there to be a distinction between thinking that 
certain facts obtain and their obtaining, contrary to 
what the transparency thesis demands. [UEV 33]
We also know that Jaspers draws a distinction 
between genuine understanding and pseudo-
understanding that is a mere interpretation of it. 
Therefore, he must be insisting on factivity of successful 
empathetic understanding and not that of pseudo-
understanding or mere interpretation. But then how 
can he simultaneously take successful understanding to 
be self-evident. In case of understanding something as 
self-evident, we cannot apparently draw a distinction 
between genuine understanding and an appearance of 
it.
If we assume that empathetic understanding of 
meaningful connections between psychic events is only 
factive and not transparent or self-evident, we need 
to make sense of how we can succeed in sharing the 
truth (making others see the truth) of our empathetic 
understanding of connections. Since, my empathetic 
understanding is a personal intuition (according to 
Jaspers), and since it is a fresh intuition every time, how 
can its truth be shared with other people? Obviously it 
is not a private intuition or understanding in the sense 
in which only I can understand it. It is not what Ludwig 
Wittgenstein calls a private language that is understood 
only by one person.9 The reason is that if empathetic 
understanding is private in a Wittgensteinian sense, 
then it will be impossible for it to exist as is the case 
with a private language. No identity conditions can 
be thought of for a private language or experience as 
Wittgenstein's private language argument has shown. 
Therefore, personal experiences or intuitions are not 
private in the sense of privacy discussed in the private 
language argument. They can and must have a public 
criterion for their existence. Given this need for a 
public criterion, the question that must be faced is, how 
truths uncovered by empathetic understanding can be 
shared? How can I share my understanding attained 
through empathy by sinking into someone's psyche at a 
personal level? Given the need for a public criterion, the 
only possible way is to ask others to sink empathetically 
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.
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into the patient's psyche as well. Then two or more 
professionals can share notes and if they agree about 
nature of connections between two events, empathetic 
understanding acquires a social criterion for its identity 
or existence.10 Without such agreed-upon empathetic 
10 See Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
understanding, insights into a patient's psychic events 
remain private in Wittgenstein's sense. Empathetic 
understanding, like all other forms of understanding, 
is sustained by shared criteria or norms of a group or 
society.
